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Abstract
In this work we consider Byzantine Consensus on undirected communication graphs
under the local broadcast model. In the classical point-to-point communication model
the messages exchanged between two nodes u, v on an edge uv of G are private.
This allows a faulty node to send conflicting information to its different neighbours,
a property called equivocation. In contrast, in the local broadcast communication
model considered here, a message sent by node u is received identically by all of its
neighbours. This restriction to broadcast messages provides non-equivocation even for
faulty nodes. In prior results [10, 11] it was shown that in the local broadcast model
the communication graph must be (⌊3f/2⌋+ 1)-connected and have minimum degree
at least 2f to achieve Byzantine Consensus. In this work we show that this network
condition is tight.
1 Introduction
In this work we consider Byzantine Consensus on undirected communication graphs under the
local broadcast model. n nodes with binary input communicate with their neighbours in the
communication graph G via message passing to reach consensus on a binary output. In addition,
up to f nodes are byzantine faulty where they may exhibit arbitrary behaviour. Non-faulty nodes
must achieve consensus in finite time and must agree on an input of some non-faulty node.
∗This research is supported in part by National Science Foundation award 1733872, and Toyota InfoTechnology
Center. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies or the U.S. government.
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In the classical point-to-point communication model the messages exchanged between two nodes
u, v on an edge uv of G are private. This allows a faulty node to send conflicting information
to its different neighbours, a property called equivocation. In contrast, in the local broadcast
communication model considered here, a message sent by node u is received identically by all of
its neighbours. This restriction to broadcast messages provides non-equivocation even for faulty
nodes. This communication model is motivated by wireless broadcast networks where messages
sent by an entity are received identically by those in its vicinity.
For point-to-point communication model in undirected graphs a (2f +1)-connectivity and n ≥
3f +1 are together necessary and sufficient [3, 4]. In contrast, prior work [10, 11] has established
that for local broadcast a (⌊3f/2⌋+ 1)-connectivity and a minimum degree of 2f is necessary. It
was also shown [10, 11] that 2f -connectivity is sufficient with local broadcast. In this work we
close this gap by presenting an algorithm for undirected graphs with (⌊3f/2⌋ + 1)-connectivity
and minimum degree of 2f .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related work. Section 3
formalizes the system model and introduces notation for the setting. We present our main result
in Section 4.
2 Related Work
The Byzantine Consensus problem was introduced by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [8, 13] who
proved that n ≥ 3f +1 is a tight condition for complete graphs. Subsequent work [3, 4] identified
necessary and sufficient conditions for arbitrary undirected graphs. For undirected graphs it is well
known that reliable communication between nodes is both necessary and sufficient for consensus.
For directed graphs Tseng and Vaidya [18] gave necessary and sufficient conditions where reliable
communication between all nodes is not provided. All of these works considered point-to-point
communication links.
Prior work [1, 7, 12, 14, 17] has looked at the local broadcast model. However, they were
interested in achieving Byzantine Broadcast as opposed to Byzantine Consensus, the aim of this
paper. In contrast with the point-to-point communication, the network requirements are different
for the two problems with local broadcast. Zhang and Sundaram [20] gave necessary and sufficient
conditions for approximate real valued Byzantine Consensus using an iterative algorithm with
local broadcast. In this work we look at exact binary valued consensus.
The ability of faulty nodes to send conflicting information to its different neighbours is called
“equivocation” in the literature. Many works have looked at the effects of restricting equivocation
for faulty nodes. Rabin and Ben-Or [15] considered a global broadcast model, which is the
same as our model on complete graphs, and showed that n ≥ 2f + 1 is both sufficient and
necessary for any multiparty protocol using synchronous communication. Clement et. al. [2]
looked at non-equivocation in complete graphs for asynchronous communication. Different works
[5, 6, 9, 16] investigate the impact of limiting equivocation via partial broadcast channels modeled
as broadcast over hyperedges.
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3 System Model and Notation
We consider n nodes in an undirected communication graph G = (V,E). Two nodes u and v
are neighbors if uv ∈ E is an edge of G. The degree of a node u is the number of u’s neighbors
or, equivalently, the number of edges incident to u. Every node v ∈ V knows the topology of
the communication graph G. The communication in the network is synchronous, allowing nodes
to make progress in synchronous rounds. We consider a local broadcast model of communication
where a messagem sent by u is received identically and correctly by all neighbors of u. In contrast,
the classical point-to-point model allows a node u to target a specific neighbor for each message
sent. This allows a bad node to possibly sent conflicting information to its different neighbors.
We also assume that when a node receives a message, it can correctly determine the neighbor
that transmitted the message.
We consider the Byzantine model of faults where a faulty node can exhibit arbitrary behavior,
including an adversary with complete knowledge of the current system state to coordinate actions
among all faulty nodes. A maximum of f nodes in G can be faulty. In the Byzantine Consensus
Problem, each node has a binary input and the goal is for each node to output a binary value,
satisfying the following conditions, in the presence of at most f faulty nodes.
1) Agreement: All non-faulty nodes must output the same value.
2) Validity: The output of each non-faulty node must be an input of some non-faulty node.
3) Termination: All non-faulty nodes must decide on their output in finite time.
For two nodes u and v, a uv-path Puv is a path from u to v. u is the source node of Puv and v is
the terminal node of Puv. Every other node in Puv is an internal node of Puv. uv-paths are node
disjoint if they do not have any common internal nodes. For a set U and node v 6∈ U , a Uv-path
is a uv-path for some node u ∈ U . Uv-paths are node disjoint if they do not have any common
source or internal nodes. A uv-path or a Uv-path is said to exclude a set of nodes X if no internal
node of the path belongs to X. Note that the source and terminal nodes can still be from X. A
uv-path or a Uv-path is fault-free if it does not have any faulty internal node, i.e. excludes the
set of faulty nodes. Note that we allow a fault-free path to have a faulty source and/or terminal
node.
A graph G is k-connected if
∣
∣V (G)
∣
∣ > k and removal of any ≤ k nodes does not disconnect G.
By Menger’s Theorem [19] a graph G is k-connected if and only if for any two nodes u, v ∈ V
there exist k node disjoint uv-paths. Another standard result [19] for k-connected graphs is that
if G is k-connected, then for any node v and a set of at least k nodes U there exist k node disjoint
Uv-paths.
4 Our Result
Our main result is that if G is (⌊3f/2⌋+1)-connected and each node has degree at least 2f , then
this is sufficient for Byzantine Consensus under the local broadcast model.
Theorem 4.1. Under the local broadcast model, Byzantine Consensus with at most f faults is
achievable if G is (⌊3f/2⌋+ 1)-connected and every node in G has degree at least 2f .
3
In contrast the point-to-point communication model requires that G must be (2f+1)-connected
and must have at least 3f + 1 nodes [3, 4]. Prior work [10, 11] has identified the graph condition
in Theorem 4.1 to be necessary under local broadcast, so the result in this paper implies that the
condition is tight. We prove Theorem 4.1 constructively by providing an algorithm that solves
Byzantine Consensus under these assumptions and an accompanying proof of correctness.
4.1 Algorithm
In this section we describe an algorithm to solve consensus on a graphG such that it is (⌊3f/2⌋+1)-
connected and each node has degree at least 2f . Every communication in the algorithm is a
message m = (L, b, P ) where L is a label, b ∈ {0, 1} is a binary valued message body, and P is a
path where the source node indicates the node where the message originated and the remaining
nodes indicate how the message has travelled so far.
A node v communicates with the rest of the graph via “flooding” where v sends a message
to the entire network with a unique label corresponding to each iteration of flooding. When a
node u receives a message m = (L, b, P ) from one of its neighbors w such that w 6∈ P , then u
forwards m′ = (L, b, P +w) to its neighbors, if P +w does not contain n− 1 nodes already. Since
communication is synchronous, v can wait for n synchronous rounds to ensure that the message
has propagated to the entire network. If a faulty node u chooses to stay silent when a message is
expected, then the non-faulty neighbors of u replace silence with a default message so that we can
assume that a message is always sent when expected, even though it may be tampered. Similarly
if a faulty node u sends a message with a label L′ when a label L is expected, then the non-faulty
neighbors of u replace the label L′ in the message with L when forwarding the message. If a faulty
node u sends a message of the form (L, b, P ) where path P + u does not exist, then its non-faulty
neighbors ignore it, so that we can assume that messages are always sent along actual paths that
exist. To achieve this, all nodes know the topology of the graph G.
In the local broadcast model we can ensure that even a faulty node can only flood a single value
with any given label, which is in contrast with the point-to-point communication model where
a faulty node can send different conflicting values to its neighbors. If a faulty node attempts to
flood two different values with a given label, then its non-faulty neighbors simply chose to forward
first such value, ignoring the rest. In general, for any label L and path P , a non-faulty node will
forward only the first message of the form (L, b, P ) it receives from a neighbor u, ignoring the
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rest.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Byzantine Consensus under local broadcast model. All steps
are performed by a node v.
Each node v has binary input inputv ∈ {0, 1} and maintains a binary state γv ∈ {0, 1}.
Initially, γv := inputv.
For every candidate faulty set F ⊆ V such that |F | ≤ f do
Step (a) Flood γv with label F . In the remaining steps of the iteration, values received
with label F are considered implicitly.
Step (b) For each node u ∈ V , identify a single uv-path Puv that excludes F . Set
Zv :=
{
u ∈ V | v received 0 from u along Puv in step (a)
}
,
Nv :=
{
u ∈ V | v received 1 from u along Puv in step (a)
}
.
Step (c) Define Av and Bv as follows.
Case 1: |Zv ∩ F | ≤ ⌊f/2⌋ and |Nv| > f . Set Av := Nv and Bv := Zv.
Case 2: |Zv ∩ F | ≤ ⌊f/2⌋ and |Nv| ≤ f . Set Av := Zv and Bv := Nv.
Case 3: |Zv ∩ F | > ⌊f/2⌋ and |Zv| > f . Set Av := Zv and Bv := Nv.
Case 4: |Zv ∩ F | > ⌊f/2⌋ and |Zv| ≤ f . Set Av := Nv and Bv := Zv.
If v ∈ Av, then γv stays unchanged. If v ∈ Bv, then identify f + 1 node disjoint
Avv-paths that exclude F . If v received identically 0 (resp. 1) along these f + 1
paths in step (a), then set γv to be 0 (resp. 1); otherwise γv stays unchanged.
end
Output γv.
The formal procedure is presented as Algorithm 1 and we give a formal proof of correctness in
Section 4.2. The algorithm is inspired by the Byzantine Consensus algorithm for directed graphs
by Tseng and Vaidya [18]. Here we describe the algorithm informally. Each node v starts with a
binary input and maintains a binary state γv which is initially set to its input. The algorithm has
one loop and in each iteration we select a set F such that |F | ≤ f . We call F the candidate faulty
set of the iteration. As a first step, each node v floods its state γv. Note that this requires v to 1)
locally broadcast γv to its neighbors and 2) assist other nodes to flood their states by forwarding
messages received from its neighbors, as described earlier.
Let Z be the set of nodes that flooded 0 in the first step and let N be the set of nodes that
flooded 1. Note that Z and N partition the node set V . In step (b), each non-faulty node v
finds its own estimate Zv and Nv of Z and V respectively, using F as the candidate faulty set.
This is done by selecting, for each node u, a single path Puv that excludes F . Such a path must
exist since G is (⌊3f/2⌋ + 1)-connected. Observe that if u = v, then Pvv is the single node path
consisting of exactly v. If v receives 0 along Puv, then v puts u in Zv and if v receives 1 along this
path, then v puts u in Nv. Note that if there exists a faulty node in V −F , then Zv and Nv may
not be the same as Z and N . It is also possible that, for a node w 6= v, Zv 6= Zw and Nv 6= Nw.
However, Zv and Nv partition the node set V .
In step (c), using F as the candidate faulty set, either nodes in Z change their state to 1 or
nodes in N change their state to 0. Since each non-faulty node v’s estimates Zv and Nv may vary
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when faulty nodes exist in V −F , non-faulty nodes may disagree on which nodes must retain their
state and which nodes must switch. The four cases in Algorithm 1 step (c) select sets Av and Bv
so that, from v’s perspective, nodes in Av retain their state and nodes in Bv switch. Av and Bv
are selected so that each node u in Bv has at least f + 1 node disjoint Avu-paths excluding F
(Lemma 4.4). This ensures that 1) when V − F contains faulty nodes, then non-faulty nodes do
not switch to a state of a faulty node (Lemma 4.5) and 2) when F contains all the faulty nodes,
then non-faulty nodes in Bv do switch their states correctly to achieve agreement (Lemma 4.6).
At the end, each node v outputs its state γv as its decision.
4.2 Proof of Correctness
We assume f > 0 in the proof. Theorem 4.1 is trivially true for f = 0. At a high level, our
objective is two folds. Firstly, we want to show that regardless of the choice of the candidate
faulty set F , a non-faulty node v will only change its state in step (c) of the iteration to match
a state of some non-faulty node at the beginning of the iteration (Lemma 4.5). By a simple
induction, it follows that the final state of v is an input of some non-faulty node. Secondly, we
want to show that when F contains the actual set of faulty nodes in a given execution, then all
non-faulty nodes reach agreement in that iteration (Lemma 4.6). Since all non-faulty nodes now
have the same state, by Lemma 4.5 it follows that in the future iterations all non-faulty nodes
will maintain this state.
We start by observing that if a message is received along a fault-free path, then the exact same
message was indeed sent. Recall that even a faulty node can only flood a single value in step (a)
of the algorithm.
Observation 4.2. For any iteration of the loop in Algorithm 1, in step (a) for any two nodes
u, v ∈ V (possibly faulty), v receives b along a fault-free uv-path Puv if and only if u flooded b.
A priori, it is not clear if the paths identified in the algorithm always exist. For paths in step
(b) the existence is relatively straightforward to prove.
Lemma 4.3. For any two nodes u, v and any iteration of the loop in Algorithm 1 with a candidate
faulty set F , there exists a uv-path that excludes F .
Proof: Let F ′ = F − u − v. Since
∣∣F ′
∣∣ ≤ f and G is (⌊3f/2⌋ + 1)-connected, we have that
G−F ′ is a connected graph and so there exists a uv-path in G−F ′ which is a uv-path in G that
excludes F . 
The next lemma shows that the choice of sets Av and Bv ensures that paths in step (c) also
exist.
Lemma 4.4. For any non-faulty node v and any iteration of the loop in Algorithm 1 with a
candidate faulty set F , in step (c) if v ∈ Bv, then there exist f + 1 node disjoint Avv-paths that
exclude F .
Proof: Fix an iteration in the algorithm and the candidate faulty set F . Consider an arbitrary
non-faulty node v such that v ∈ Bv in step (c). There are 4 cases to consider, corresponding to
the 4 cases in step (c).
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Case 1: |Zv ∩ F | ≤ ⌊f/2⌋ and |Nv| > f . Then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv. Therefore there exist at least
f+1 nodes in Av. Node v selects f+1 nodes A
′
v from Av by choosing all nodes from Av ∩F
and the rest arbitrarily from Av −F . By choice of Bv, we have that B
′
v = Bv ∩ (F − v) has
at most ⌊f/2⌋ nodes. Since G is (⌊3f/2⌋+ 1)-connected, so there exist f + 1 node disjoint
A′vv-paths in G that exclude B
′
v. Furthermore, since all the nodes in Av ∩ F are the source
nodes in these paths and F = (Av ∩ F ) ∪ (Bv ∩ F ), we have that these paths exclude F
1.
Case 2: |Zv ∩ F | ≤ ⌊f/2⌋ and |Nv| ≤ f . Then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv. Since the degree of v is at
least 2f and there are at most f nodes in Bv (including v), we have that v has at least f +1
neighbors in Av. There are therefore f + 1 node disjoint Avv-paths that have no internal
nodes and hence exclude F .
Case 3: |Zv ∩ F | > ⌊f/2⌋ and |Zv| > f . Then Av := Zv and Bv := Nv. We have that
|Nv ∩ F | = |F | −|Zv ∩ F |
≤ f − ⌊f/2⌋ − 1
≤ ⌊f/2⌋.
So this case is the same as Case 1 with the roles of Zv and Nv swapped.
Case 4: |Zv ∩ F | > ⌊f/2⌋ and |Zv| ≤ f . Then Av := Nv and Bv := Zv. From the analysis in Case 3,
we have that |Nv ∩ F | ≤ ⌊f/2⌋. So this case is the same as Case 2 with the roles of Zv and
Nv swapped.
In all four cases we have that there do exist f + 1 node disjoint Avv-paths that exclude F . 
We now show that in any iteration, the state of a non-faulty node at the end of the iteration
equals the state of some non-faulty node at the beginning of the iteration.
Lemma 4.5. For any non-faulty node v and any iteration of the loop in Algorithm 1, the state
of v at the end of the iteration is equal to a state of some non-faulty node u at the beginning of
the iteration.
Proof: Fix an iteration in the algorithm and the candidate faulty set F . For any node u,
we denote the state at the beginning of the iteration by γstartu and the state at the end of the
iteration by γendu . Consider an arbitrary non-faulty node v and the sets Av and Bv in step (c). Let
P1, . . . , Pf+1 be the f +1 node disjoint Avv-paths identified by v in step (c). If γ
start
v = γ
end
v , then
the claim is trivially true. So suppose v ∈ Bv and v receives identical values along P1, . . . , Pf+1
in step (a). Since the number of faulty nodes is at most f , thus at least one of these paths is both
fault-free and has a non-faulty source node, say u. By Observation 4.2, it follows that whatever
value is received by v along this path in step (a) is the value flooded by u. Therefore γendv = γ
start
u ,
where u is a non-faulty node, as required. 
Next, we show that when the candidate faulty set F is properly selected, all non-faulty nodes
reach agreement in that iteration.
Lemma 4.6. Consider an iteration of the loop in Algorithm 1 such that all faulty nodes are
contained in the candidate faulty set F . Then for any two non-faulty nodes u, v ∈ V , we have
that u and v have the same state at the end of the iteration.
1recall that a path that excludes X does not have nodes from X as internal nodes; however, nodes from X may
be the source or terminal nodes.
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Proof: Fix an iteration of the algorithm and the candidate faulty set F such that all faulty
nodes are contained in F . Let Z be the set of nodes that flooded 0 in step (a) of the iteration and
let N be the set of nodes that flooded 1 in step (a). We first show that for any non-faulty node
v, Zv = Z and Nv = N . Consider an arbitrary node w that flooded 0 (resp. 1) in step (a) of the
iteration so that w ∈ Z (resp. w ∈ N). Observe that Pwv identified in step (b) of the iteration
excludes F and is fault-free. Therefore, by Observation 4.2 v receives 0 (resp. 1) along Pwv and
correctly sets w ∈ Zv (resp. w ∈ Nv), as required.
It follows that for any two non-faulty nodes u and v, we have that Zu = Zv = Z and Nu =
Nv = N . Thus Au = Av and Bu = Bv. Let A := Au and B := Bu. Now all nodes in A flooded
identical value in step (a), say α. If u ∈ A, then u’s state is α at the beginning of the iteration
and stays unchanged in step (c). Therefore, at the end of the iteration γu = α. If u ∈ B, then
observe that the f + 1 node disjoint Au-paths identified by u in step (c) are all fault-free. By
Observation 4.2, it follows that u receives α identically along these f +1 paths and so, at the end
of the iteration, γu = α. Similarly for v, we have that γv = α, as required. 
We now have all the necessary ingredients to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: The algorithm terminates in finite time at every node. This satisfies
the termination property. Validity follows from Lemma 4.5 via a simple induction. For agreement,
observe that there exists at least one iteration of the loop in Algorithm 1 where all faulty nodes are
contained in the candidate faulty set F , namely when F is exactly the set of faulty nodes. From
Lemma 4.6 we have that all non-faulty nodes have the same state at the end of this iteration. From
Lemma 4.5, it follows that non-faulty nodes do not change their states in subsequent iterations.
Therefore, all non-faulty nodes output the same state at the end of the algorithm. 
5 Discussion
In this work, we have presented a constructive proof that it is sufficient for the communication
graph G to be (⌊3f/2⌋ + 1)-connected and have degree at least 2f for Byzantine Consensus
under local broadcast. The results in this paper along with prior results in [10, 11] show that
the condition that G must be (⌊3f/2⌋ + 1)-connected and have degree at least 2f is tight. The
algorithm provided in this paper is not polynomial. In [10, 11] we gave an efficient algorithm
when G is 2f -connected. We leave finding an efficient algorithm for the tight condition for future
work.
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